Abstract. The security of two message authentication code (MAC) algorithms is considered: the MD5-based envelope method (RFC 1828), and the banking standard MAA (ISO 8731{2). Customization of a general MAC forgery attack allows improvements in both cases. For the envelope method, the forgery attack is extended to allow key recovery; for example, a 128-bit key can be recovered using 2 67 known text-MAC pairs and time plus 2 13 chosen texts. For MAA, internal collisions are found with fewer and shorter messages than previously by exploiting the algorithm's internal structure; consequently, the number of chosen texts (each 256 Kbyte long) for a forgery can be reduced by two orders of magnitude, e.g. from 2 24 to 2
Introduction
Message authentication code (MAC) algorithms are symmetric-key techniques which provide data origin authentication and data integrity. They have received widespread use in many practical applications, e.g. banking 9]. The primary MAC algorithms used historically have been CBC-MAC and MAA. CBC-MAC 10, 11] is derived from the cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode of block ciphers such as DES; some theoretical support for this method has been given 1]. The Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA) is an ISO standard 10] which dates back to 1984 7] . The so-called envelope-based MACs of Tsudik 18] and others have also received recent attention (see e.g. Kaliski and Robshaw 12] 4 ], MDx-MAC by Preneel and van Oorschot 14] , and the bucket-hashing MAC of Rogaway 16] .
Envelope-based MACs o er speed and simplicity. The basic technique involves using a secret key as part of the input to an unkeyed hash function. The envelope method of RFC 1828 12, 17] , arising from the IPSEC working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), prepends and appends a secret key K to the message input: MAC(x) = h(KkpkxkK). Here k denotes concatenation, and p denotes some padding bits. This construction was supported by a security proof under assumptions regarding the pseudo-randomness of MD5 3 ]. An alternative HMAC 4] , involving two invocations of h( ), is de ned as MAC(x) = h(Kkp 1 kh(Kkp 2 kx)), where p 1 and p 2 are strings of padding bits which pad K out to a full block; a version without padding was proposed earlier in 12] . The security of HMAC can be proven based on the assumptions that h( ) is collision resistant for a random and secret IV , and that the complete output of the compression function is hard to predict when its rst input is random and secret.
Recent systematic analysis of MACs includes a new general attack by Preneel and van Oorschot 14] which applies to all iterated MACs. It involves a birthday attack using known text-MAC pairs, after which additional chosen text-MAC pairs (e.g. a single text for the most common version of CBC-MAC) allows MAC forgery. Overall this requires about 2 n=2 known text-MAC pairs, where n is the bitlength of the internal memory (chaining variable) of the MAC algorithm.
The current paper adapts and re nes this attack schema speci cally for the envelope method (e.g. RFC 1828) and for MAA, yielding signi cant improvements and new results in each case. The sequel is organized as follows. x2 reviews de nitions and the general attack on iterated MACs. x3 presents a new key recovery attack on the envelope method, while x4 gives an optimized forgery attack plus a new key recovery attack on MAA. x5 concludes the paper.
Background De nitions and Review
A hash function h map bitstrings of arbitrary nite length into strings of xed length (say m bits). An unkeyed hash function does not involve secret parameters. Such a function is said to be one-way if it is both preimage-resistant (it is computationally infeasible to nd any input which hashes to any pre-speci ed output); and second-preimage resistant (it is computationally infeasible to nd any second input which has the same output as any speci ed input). Ideally, nding a preimage or second preimage requires about 2 m operations. A one-way hash function is said to be collision resistant if it is furthermore computationally infeasible to nd a collision (i.e. two distinct inputs that hash to the same result). For ideal such functions, no collisions may be found more e ciently than by a birthday-like attack of about 2 m=2 operations.
A keyed hash function h has a secret k-bit key K as a secondary input; when used for message authentication, such a function is called a message authentication code (MAC). Computing h K (x) (denoted simply h(x) when K is understood) must be easy, given h, K, and an input x. An adversary able, without initial knowledge of K, to nd a corresponding MAC for any single message, is said to be capable of existential forgery. An adversary able to determine the MAC for a message of his choice is said to be capable of selective forgery. Ideally, existential forgery is computationally infeasible; a less demanding requirement is that only selective forgery is so. Practical attacks often require that a forgery is veri able, i.e. that the forged MAC is known to be correct (e.g. before attempting to use it to advantage) with probability near 1. A key recovery attack is more devastating than forgery { here an adversary is able to recover K itself, and thus carry out arbitrary selective forgeries. Ideally, any attack allowing key recovery requires about 2 k operations. Veri cation of such an attack requires k=m text-MAC pairs.
In a chosen-text attack, an adversary may request and receive MACs corresponding to a number of messages of his choice, before completing his (forgery or key recovery) attack. For forgery, the forged MAC must be on a message di erent than any for which a MAC was previously obtained. In an adaptive chosen-text attack, requests may depend on the outcome of previous requests.
Iterative hash functions and MACs h process inputs in successive xed-size b-bit blocks. A message or text input x is divided into blocks x 1 through x t , the last of which is padded appropriately if required for completeness. h involves a compression function f and an n-bit (n m) chaining variable H i between stage i ? 1 and stage i: H 0 = IV ; H i = f(H i?1 ; x i ); 1 i t; h(x) = H t .
MACs often involve an output transformation g applied to H t , yielding a MAC result h(x) = g(H t ). The secret key may be employed in the IV , in f, and/or in g. For an input pair (x; x 0 ) with h(x) = g(H t ) and h(x 0 ) = g(H 0 Lemma 1 14 ]. An internal collision for an iterated MAC allows a veri able MAC forgery, through a chosen-text attack requiring a single chosen text.
This follows since for an internal collision (x; x 0 ), h(x k y) = h(x 0 k y) for any single block y; thus a requested MAC on the chosen text x k y provides a forged MAC (the same) for x 0 k y. The general forgery attack (Proposition 2) depends on the nature of the compression function f. In MAA and in envelope methods based on MD5 15] , the compression function f is considered to behave as a random mapping for xed x i . We describe now a new divide and conquer key recovery attack. It applies to the method of RFC 1828 (also proposed in 12]), and exploits the padding procedure of MD5, which was not designed to conceal secret keys. This attack again requires a very large number of known text-MAC pairs (variable depending on choices made, but on the order of 2 64 ); however, the work complexity for key recovery is decreased dramatically from previous numbers (from 2 128 to 2 66 ). The new key recovery attack is applicable to the basic envelope method including the MD5-based RFC 1828 (IPSEC) variant and other hash functions using MD5-like padding. It can also recover the trail key of the variation with distinct keys. First recall the padding procedure for MD5 for a message input y of bitlength b =jyj. A single`1' bit is appended to y, followed by z`0' bits (0 z 511), where z is chosen to make the sum of b and the bitlength of the padding equal 448 mod 512. The 64-bit integer representation of b is then appended to complete the last block. For the special case of the IPSEC envelope method with a 128-bit key, the data, after padding, processed by the compression function of MD5 has the form: KkpkxkKk1000 : : :000kb. Here De ne an internal collision as a pair of inputs (x; x 0 ) which produce the same MAC output, and for which the internal chaining variables collide just before the block containing the key (or any partial key). Since such a collision is detectable only through a collision for the MAC, all blocks following the internal collision must be identical in the two members of the colliding input pair. Therefore the attack of Proposition 2 requires the lengths of all the messages to be equal, and the last r message bits (which are either in the last or in the second last block)
to be the same. If r = 0 (i.e. jxj= 0 mod 512), there is no condition on the last message bits.
Consider the case r = 511 (i.e. z = 320). There is a single key bit in the second last block. Therefore 511 message bits in the second last block must be identical to allow for identi cation of an internal collision. However, if we simply guess that key bit, the unknown key is restricted to the last block, and collisions after the second last block are again internal collisions (or almost internal collisions). A rst observation is that this reduces the constraint on the message. A more signi cant consequence is that by using the attack of Lemma 1, one can actually verify the guess for that key bit. This leads to a powerful divide and conquer attack for extracting the key, which may be illustrated as follows.
Let x be a 480-bit message. Then r=480, z=351, and the rst block contains the padded key K. The second block contains 480 message bits and 32 key bits.
The last block contains the 96 remaining key bits, a`1' bit followed by 351`0' bits, and the 64-bit length eld b=1120 ( , no other pairs of MACs will be equal. This reveals 32 key bits. For the external collision, with overwhelming probability none of the pairs gives the same MAC.
It is easy to extend the attack to nd further key bits. One possibility is to repeat the above procedure using messages of length 448 bits, yielding the next 32 key bits. The remaining 64 key bits are then most e ciently found (oline) exhaustively. Alternatively, one could begin with messages of bitlength 448, which would require 2 66 chosen texts, but reveal 64 bits of the key immediately. This reasoning allows the following general result: Proposition 3. There exists a key recovery attack on one-key envelope methods such as that of RFC 1828, which requires q = d64=te steps (1 t 64) to nd 64 bits of the key.
Step i ( ) of chosen texts to identify the key bits. The attack relies on the key being split across blocks. While it is not practical, vulnerability to it represents a certi cational weakness, and indicating an architectural aw. One concludes it is more secure to isolate the entire trailing key in a separate block (together with the message length and possibly a pseudorandom string). However, this requires changing the padding procedure for MD5, contravening an original motivating factor { being able to call the underlying hash function directly. Nonetheless, customized MACs (as suggested in 12, 14]) appear to o er a more secure alternative to constructions relying directly on unkeyed hash functions. Note also that no one has yet evaluated functions such as MD5 with respect to pseudo-randomness properties (especially if only part of the input is replaced by a secret key).
New Forgery and Key Recovery Attacks on MAA
In this section, a preliminary description of MAA is followed by a discussion of how the basic attack of Proposition 2 may be customized for MAA, and optimized using special messages. An extension of these to the special mode of MAA for long messages is then presented, followed by a new key recovery attack.
Description of MAA
Designed by Davies, MAA was presented at Crypto' 84 7, 8] and is in the ISO 8731-2 banking standard 10]. On PCs and workstations it runs only 40% slower than MD5. The algorithm consists of three parts. The prelude is a key expansion from 64 bits (two 32-bit words) to 192 bits (six 32-bit words). From the rst key word are derived the parameters H1 0 , V , S; from the second, the parameters H2 0 , W, T. The prelude, which needs only be executed during installation of a new key, also eliminates \weaker bytes" 00 x or FF x in keys and parameters. The two words of the chaining variable (H1 i ; H2 i ) are initialized with (H1 0 ; H2 0 ).
The main loop mixes the chaining variable with message word x i (0 i t ? 1) and key dependent parameters V and W. A single iteration of the main loop can be described as follows:
Step These constants x 8 bits of the second factor (four to 0, and four to 1). The output transformation g consists of the coda iterations (where the key-dependent S and T play the role of x i ) and nal XORing as noted above.
Basic MAC Forgery on MAA
The basic attack of Proposition 2 can be applied to MAA with parameters n = 64, m = 32. However, an internal collision (i.e. a collision for H1 and H2) yields an external collision only if V is in the same position (the number of bits over which V is rotated e ectively adds 5 bits to the 64-bit MAA internal memory).
This e ect can be countered by using messages of the same length modulo 32, or messages for which the common trailing blocks start at the same position modulo 32. Note however that this is not strictly necessary: if the number of known texts given by Proposition 2 is multiplied by about 32, the condition on the length can be omitted. A second observation is that the output transformation consists of two iterations, providing two ways to obtain an external collision; we expect two additional external collisions after processing S and T (for 2 32:5 messages), which accounts for (an expected) four additional chosen texts to eliminate them. A third observation is that in the second chain, the modulus (2 32 ? 2) is even, while the second multiplier is odd (the least signi cant bit of D is 1). This implies that the least signi cant bit of H2 i , denoted LSB(H2 i ), is equal to the LSB(H2 i?1 x i ). Consequently, LSB(H2 t ) = LSB(H2 0 ) L t i=1 LSB(x i ), and the 64-bit internal memory can be reduced to 63 bits by making the second term of the right hand side a constant. This assumes that the attacker can choose texts for which the value of this sum is constant. Table 2 gives the parameters of the attack for various values s. Here n = 63, m = 32, and the last column counts the total number of bytes of the known and chosen texts. Increasing s allows a reduction in the number of known and chosen texts (the`known' messages begin to resemble`chosen' messages), but increases the total number of bytes which must be processed with the known key. This situation can be improved (as subsequently explained) by selecting messages with a special structure. Since fast MAA implementations process 3{4 Megabytes per second, processing 2 One can nd by exhaustive examination which values of the rst 32-bit word of the input key yield such values of V . Therefore the number of weak keys is independent of the second input key word, and thus 2 32 times larger. If V has period r, the forgery above requires r (2 31 ? 2) zero blocks. Verifying the forgery allows an attacker to obtain information on V , which is undesirable since it leaks partial key bits. It is relatively easy (x4.5) to detect whether a key is weak, leading to a key recovery attack on these keys. These observations suggest that the fact that V depends on only 32 bits of the input key is a design weakness in MAA.
A second class of weak keys are keys for whichŨ has small order. It is possible to obtain an internal collision using shorter messages (cf. Table 2) by exploiting the properties of zero blocks presented in Lemma 4. This requires chosen texts rather than known texts. As discussed above, for a text with a su ciently large number of trailing zero blocks, H1 t becomes constant (i.e. FFFFFFFF x ) with high probability; if about p 2 2 16 such texts are available, one expects by the birthday paradox to nd two texts with colliding values for H2 t as well. The third observation of x4.2 implies that 2 16 such texts will su ce if the sum of the least signi cant bits of the message blocks is kept constant. We will assume that this condition is satis ed. Note that the attack can be extended easily to the case where the zero blocks are followed by some arbitrary common trailing blocks.
The exact number of chosen texts for this improved variant can be computed as follows. trailing zero blocks for some , we expect to nd about 2 16 messages for which the rst chaining variable H1 t becomes equal to FFFFFFFF x (for simplicity it is assumed that 1=32, since otherwise the second prime factor (p = 257) has to be taken into account in the calculation). By the birthday paradox, the expected number of collisions for the second chaining variable H2 t , which corresponds to a (complete) internal collision is then equal to ), while the number of chosen texts can be reduced by increasing .
It is possible to use even shorter messages, but then we assume that H1 t has become with high probability a multiple of (2 32 ? 1)=65 537 = 65 535 = FFFF x . A complete internal collision requires then a collision in a set of size about 2 47 , which implies that more chosen messages are needed. In this case must exceed 1=4 to avoid interference of the second prime factor (257).
An overview of the trade-o s is given in Table 3 . These trade-o s are more realistic (cf. Table 2 ) with respect to the total number of bytes; this number increases only slightly while reducing the number of chosen texts. However, chosen texts are more di cult to obtain than known texts. For a xed key and message block x i , the compression function of MAA is not a permutation. This causes the \loss of memory" problem, as was pointed out by Block 6] , and mentioned by Davies 7] . If a large number of variations of the rst blocks are chosen, all 2 n states will be reached at some point. However, if the next message blocks are kept constant, it can be shown that the fraction of states y i] at stage i can be approximated by 2=(i + 1 3 ln i + 9 5 ), for i 1. To control this e ect, ISO 8731 10] limits the size of the messages to 4 10 6 bytes ( 3.8 Megabytes). Also, the standard de nes a special mode for messages longer than 1024 bytes (256 blocks). In this mode, MAA is applied to the rst 1024 bytes, and the corresponding 4-byte MAC is concatenated to the next 1024 bytes of the message to form the new input of MAA. This procedure is repeated with the next 1024-byte block, until the end of the message is reached. This may be interpreted as the de nition of a \meta" compression function based on MAA which compresses 1028 bytes to 4 bytes. This thwarts attacks using more than 256 zero blocks, including the forgery attack of Proposition 5 which requires a single chosen text.
However, it follows from Table 3 that the attack with zero blocks can be done with about 2 24:7 messages of about 1000 bytes, independent of the special mode. Ironically the basic attack (using Proposition 2) of x4.2 works even slightly better with the special mode: in the case that s 256, an additional non-bijective mapping exists, resulting in an additional opportunity for an internal collision.
Consequently s may be replaced by s + bs=256c.
Key Recovery Attack on MAA
A key recovery attack on a MAC is considerably more serious than a forgery, as key recovery allows MAC forgery on arbitrary messages and without additional work, whereas forgeries are often existential only (and then of questionable practical use) and often chosen texts are required for each additional forged MAC. Under certain circumstances an internal collision for MAA allows key recovery.
A rst case is when we have a weak key for which the period of V < 32 (see x4.3). One can verify the period of V by simulating the attack of Lemma 1, using two sets of 2 17:3 chosen texts containing 131 072 trailing zero blocks each. In one set all messages have length 0 mod 32; in the other all have length 16 mod 32. One expects 9 internal collisions between messages of these two sets and 6 external collisions, but these cannot yet be distinguished from each other. The simulated attack of Lemma 1 then (with high probability) lters the external collisions. If V has period < 32, this attack will work for all the internal collisions, and it will fail otherwise. The key recovery attack will fail if there are no internal collisions; since the number of internal collisions is Poisson distributed, the probability of this event, for 9 internal collisions as above, is e ?9 0:01%. In this way it is evident if V belongs to this special set of 2 We have developed an algorithm which can then solve for the 64 bits of the key inputs (via the 128 bits of the unknown parameters), starting from the least signi cant bit (to control the propagation of the carries). Also, the algorithm exploits the fact that (H1 0 ; V ) and (H2 0 ; W) depend on di erent halves of the input key. A preliminary estimate is that the key can be recovered in at most 2 50 operations (cf. 2 64 for exhaustive key search). The expected number of chosen texts required is about 2 35 to guarantee a high success probability. More details will be provided in the full paper.
Concluding Remarks
Two improved variations of a general MAC forgery attack have been presented, tailored for speci c algorithms. For both the envelope method as discussed herein and the MAA, the forgery attack may be adapted to allow key recovery. In addition the internal structure of MAA may be exploited to reduce the total number of bytes of known text-MAC pairs required for the attack. An important conclusion is that the standard padding of a hash function should be modi ed when it is transformed into a MAC. This should not be surprising, since unkeyed hash functions are not typically designed for use as MACs.
